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The ability of being selective, i.e. saying the right thing at the right 
time and place, is essential for successful interaction. This article examines 
the dynamic process of expression and comprehension in language 
interactions and deals with two issues. The first is that if selectiveness is 
common and indispensable in language use it should be accepted as an 
appropriate communication device. The other issue is how the selectiveness 
principle fits in with Grice's (1975, 1989) four conversational maxims. This 
study will be conducted primarily in the context of real estate advertising 
language, by analysing how real estate agents use selectiveness to convey 
their intended information and hearers work out the inferential meaning 
based on their common knowledge and contextual cues. 2
Over the past three decades, there have been continuous debates on 
Grice's maxims. This study will propose the inclusion of the selectiveness 
principle into Grice's maxims. The proposal is based on an analysis of 
advertising language which will show that language users tend to be 
selective while still managing to fit in with Grice's framework. Being 
selective is not an ad hoc characteristic of advertising language; it is a 
pervasive, legitimate, tactful and effective communicative device used in 
everyday language. Following the selectiveness principle is a matter of 
following one's common sense. This research will argue that while 
selectiveness doesn't violate Grice's maxims, it is different in that it is used 
to achieve appropriateness in terms of cultural and social norms. 
Differences are drawn between inferential meaning and Grice's 
conversational implicature to justify the proposed modification of Grice's 
maxims with the addition of the selectiveness principle.   
 
I A Pervasive, Legitimate, Tactful and Effective Communicative 
Device 
 
Being selective in language use is to choose an appropriate utterance 
suitable to the particular context. For example, a neighbour's teenage girl 
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has a weight problem and is very self-conscious about it. When asked about 
her weight, one may stop short by saying ‘she looks fine to me, no need for 
everyone to have a supermodel figure’. Another example, commenting on a 
fellow student's essay, one may say 'it reads well and has no typos'. Hearers 
would be able to work out that the speakers are being selective about what 
they say. They don't want to hurt their neighbour or fellow student but don't 
want to lie either. Thus they have to choose words carefully, in order to 
avoid talking about any negatives regarding the girl's weight or the student's 
essay.  
While it is not rare to see selectiveness in everyday language use, this 
kind of language behaviour occurs most frequently in advertising due to its 
commercial nature. Imagine that one is looking through a property press 
and reads a description of a house as: “a house with character”.  What 
would the reader think of it? It would not be surprising that the reader infers 
that the house is old, possibly in bad shape. From the advertiser's point of 
view, he is not lying by being selective or skilful with his words. Instead of 
using ‘old, not in good shape’ he chose ‘character’. Fortunately, readers are, 
most of time, able to get the inferential meaning out of the literal meaning 
of the text3. 
This phenomenon demonstrates how people use language in reality. It 
is common practice that language users are selective whenever necessary 
and selectiveness is also part of language competence. The more skilfully 
one uses the principle of selectiveness, the more tactful and effective one 
becomes in language communication. This poses a challenge to linguists 
and others to go beyond the semantic meaning when studying language and 
work out the pragmatic meaning conveyed by utterances.  
 
1.1 Advertising Language and Selectiveness 
Let us analyse examples of selectiveness in real estate advertising, 
extracted primarily from issues of Property Press, published in Auckland, 
New Zealand.  
a. ‘A classic villa/character charmer’ 
Probably a place falling apart, in any event an old house.  The agent 
uses 'classic' to avoid saying that the villa is aging and inferior. The 
word 'classic' attracts people's attention more in its positive aspects: 
stylish, creative, artistic and established.  
b. “A first buyer's home/a great place to start/suit young 
couple/affordable living” 
Probably a cheap, run down place with not much space. However, the 
right phrases are chosen to steer buyers' attention away from those 
negative aspects to their own realistic situation, making the house 
appear to be worth considering.  
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c. “A house with great potential/potential to redevelop and 
renovate/do up/polish up & prosper” 
Probably a house in bad shape. Agent selects the above descriptions to 
lead people to think what they can do with the property in the future, 
rather than focusing on the present state which is probably undesirable. 
Providing the buyer a rosy picture for the future would certainly 
increase the chances of selling the property.  
d. “Needs tender loving care” 
Possibly a pretty bad situation inside and out. The agent shifts attention 
from the house to the potential buyer and places the responsibility of 
taking care of the house on them. Someone might buy into it thinking 
that he is the one who will be able to look after the property well. 
e. “Easy living/care section” 
Possibly a small outdoor area. The focus is on the positive side of a 
small outdoor area, meaning there is no need to spend a lot of time 
looking after the garden and mowing the lawn.  
f. “No need for cars, walk to everywhere” 
Most definitely no car park or garage. The agent knows very well that 
people consider parking space something essential. He figures that if he 
says that there is no need for a car then clients may be more likely to 
accept the property. The logic is if there is no need for a car then it is 
all right having no car park.   
g. “Cosy and neat” 
Probably a small house. However, since 'small house' would not go 
down well with buyers, 'cosy and neat' would do a better job. 
Advertised from the positive side of being cosy and neat would give 
people a warm and comfortable feeling about the place, they may be 
more inclined to buy the house.  
h. “Investment opportunity” 
May not be suitable for owner to live in, possibly due to the shabby 
conditions of the house. Saying that it is for investment may open a 
new opportunity for the property to sell. Buyers for investment would 
certainly be interested in taking a look. 
Examples like the above are everywhere in real estate advertising. 
Agents need to think very hard in order to come up with the right thing to 
say when advertising. They have to be skilful when it comes down to using 
the principle of selectiveness.  
 
1.2 Why Selectiveness   
The above examples illustrate that agents select words carefully by 
focusing on positives and avoiding negatives in order to maximize the 
benefit of advertising. They know full well that at the end of day, many 
buyers would figure out the contextual/pragmatic meaning 4 . The reason 
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agents continue using selective language generation after generation is that 
it may at least get people through the door. Once their prospective buyers 
arrive, they can then have something to build from and hopefully their 
skilful persuasion will result in a sale. 
Therefore being selective in advertising is crucial in the real estate 
business, and it is also a fact of life in the context of commercials: no one 
would advertise the negative aspects of their products unless required to do 
so.   
Selectiveness is not unique to commercials.  The strategies real estate 
agents use are not very different from those we use in everyday speech. For 
example, when describing a girl who is fat, we might select the expression 
“a big boned girl”. When writing a recommendation letter, we tend to use 
“with potential to become a good teacher/researcher” or “given time he will 
thrive”, instead of saying “lacks teaching/research experience”. When asked 
to comment on a lousy cook, we may say that the dish looks great, creative 
and artistic in order to avoid commenting on the fact that the food tastes 
awful. Similarly, when commenting on someone, we would be happy to 
describe how great his personality is and how helpful he is to his elderly 
neighbour, but stop short of saying that he is not very intelligent.  
So, why are people selective in using language? One obvious reason is 
that it is our society's norm to say the right thing at the right time. By 
conforming to this protocol, one can fit nicely into our society; otherwise 
one will not go very far nor have many friends. However, the most 
important reason for being selective is that it is a tactful and effective 
communicational device. As mentioned above in the real estate agent's 
situation, it certainly serves his purpose very effectively. In everyday life, 
being selective is also a more tactful way to communicate.  Let us revisit the 
case of commenting on the lousy cook. Imagine at a formal dinner if a guest 
said straight to the cook's face that his food tasted awful, it would upset 
others, especially the cook. Instead, one might tactfully praise the cook by 
saying something like the presentation of dish is great.
One remaining question then is whether or not the selectiveness is 
legitimate, i.e. if it is the right thing to do. Are we lying by being selective? 
Probably not, because we do not deny the facts, e.g. saying food tastes good 
when in fact it does not, or saying there are three bedrooms when in fact 
there are only two. All we do is to utilize the principle of selectiveness to do 
the right thing. The principle of selectiveness is used by just about every 
profession and everywhere in daily life, although perhaps some may use it 
more frequently and effectively than others.  Commercials rely on it for 
business profits, while in everyday life people use it for purposes of 
showing politeness, keeping face, etc., as along as it is suitable at a specific 
moment. Having argued that selectiveness is a pervasive, legitimate, tactful 
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and effective communicational device, next we discuss where it fits in with 
Grice's conversational maxims. 
 
II.  Grice's Conversational Maxims and Selectiveness 
What has been discussed above raises a question of whether or not the 
selective principle could be in line with Grice's cooperative principles and 
conversational maxims, the focus of this section.  
 
2.1 Grice's Maxims 
Grice's cooperative principle is a principle of conversation, claiming 
that participants expect that each will make a “conversational contribution 
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1975: 
45). The idea of Grice's maxims is to make it clear to language users what 
good communication practice is and if we all make an effort to follow them 
we can become more effective in talking to each other. The maxims are not 
rules but rather conventions or right things to do.  
A number of works have been done regarding Grice's framework, such 
as Kasher (1976, 1982, 1986. 1987) and Keenan (1976). It has been argued 
that Grice's maxims are not held by speakers of various cultures. For 
example, Keenan (1976) stated that people in Madagascar tend not to give 
information when required, which intentionally and systematically violate 
Grice's Quantity Maxim. Keenan questioned the feasibility that the maxims 
can apply universally and independently of culture, style and genre. Kasher 
(1982) suggested that Keenan's and similar apparent counter-examples to 
Grice's maxims could be better explained in terms of the rationality 
principles and its consequences, if proper attention is paid not only to its 
“most effective” component but also to its “at least cost” component. It was 
observed that Malagasy speakers seemed to try to strike some balance 
between being most effective in presenting their beliefs, while paying the 
least cost in terms of commitments they wish to spare (Kasher 1982). 
Clyne's (1994) revised maxims for intercultural analysis have more 
regard for the communicative patterns of non-English cultures; however, 
they don't altogether meet the needs of inter-cultural communication. The 
universality of Grice's Co-operative Principle and Brown and Levinson's 
theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987) has been questioned 
(Wierzbicka 1985, 1991/2003 and Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997) on the 
basis of the cultural relativity and different cultural scripts. For example, 
there would be different expectations and interpretations of sincerity and 
relevance in a given communication, or the ranking of imposition when 
making a request.  
Wilson and Sperber (2002) question the view that verbal 
communication is governed by a maxim, norm or convention of truthfulness 
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which applies at the level of what is literally meant, or what is said. They 
argue that verbal communication is governed by expectations of relevance, 
raised by literal, loose and figurative uses alike. In addition, they state that 
the notions of “literal meaning” and “what is said” play no useful 
theoretical role in the study of language use, and that the nature of explicit 
communication would have to be rethought.  
A number of questions have been raised, including the source of the 
cooperative principle and maxims (e.g. whether they are culturally specific 
or universal), definition of terminologies (e.g. vagueness of 'relevance') and 
adequate explanation of comprehension procedure (e.g. exactly how hearers 
identify conversational implicatures).  
In general, there have been three directions for the development of 
Grice's original proposals:  
a.  To further develop Grice's maxims while remaining close to the 
spirit of the original maxims, including Levinson (1983, 2000), Brown 
and Levinson (1987), Horn (1973, 1984) and Clark (1996). 
b.  To propose alternative principles and maxims, including R. Lakoff 
(1973, 1976), Leech (1983), Attardo (1997, 1999, 2000).  
c.  To substitute Grice's original proposal with a more general 
cognitive principle, i.e. Sperber and Wilson's relevance-theoretic 
framework (1986/1995, 1998, 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2004)  
 
It should be pointed that Grice's maxims depict a rosy, idealised and 
simplified language use, whereas reality is a much more complex and multi-
dimensional. In actual conversations, telling the whole truth might be seen 
as impolite or somehow inappropriate. There also tend to be cross-cultural 
differences, not always following a universal principle. It seems that some 
cultures/languages (e.g. Chinese) prescript their speakers quite frequently to 
express things in an indirect manner, which means they are unable to follow 
Grice's maxims. In such cases, there is a clash between Grice's maxims and 
the pragmatic rules of conversation, which are culturally sensitive. For 
example, when being offered a drink, a typical Chinese would habitually 
say no the first time while expecting the offer would be made at least twice 
or three times. This is a kind of phatic language communication, i.e. saying 
no and not really meaning no. In this sort of situation, if someone doesn't 
play by the cultural norm, then he would sound odd.   
 
 
2.2 Grice's Maxims and the Selectiveness Principle 
First, let us examine if selectiveness violates any of Grice's maxims.  
Maxim of quality: “‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’... 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you 
lack adequate evidence’. (Grice, 1975: 46). 
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Being selective is not necessarily untruthful. For example, an agent 
says that a house ‘suits young couples or first home buyers’. While the 
inferential meaning of the description could be that the house is small and 
not luxurious, as far as the speaker is concerned, all he does is to select one 
particular aspect of the house to suit his purpose. In any event, the agent is 
telling the truth because he believes that the house does suit young couples 
or first homebuyers. Only when the house has one bedroom but is 
advertised as having two, does the agent violate the quality maxim. Here the 
agent doesn't give false information, he is just being selective, and therefore 
no rule has been broken as far as the maxim of quality is concerned. 
Maxim of quantity: ‘1. Make your contribution as informative as is 
required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your 
contribution more informative than is required’ (Grace, 1975: 45). 
One may think that selectiveness seems to violate this maxim, due to 
its nature of being less informative. For example, real estate agents tend 
only to touch on certain desirable aspects (character, great potential, suitable 
to first home buyers, etc.), but do not provide negative information (old, 
scruffy conditions, etc.). The same applies to situations in everyday life 
when people only say what is considered to be polite.   
However, it is not quite the case, because the maxim here says that we 
should be as informative AS REQUIRED, giving NO MORE and no less 
information. Required by what? For example, as far as the real estate 
commercials are concerned, they are not required by their cultural protocols 
to use words like ‘old’ and ‘scruffy’, they may, as they prefer, advertise in a 
positive tone by using words like ‘character’ and ‘great potential’. 
Similarly, in social situations we are also not required by our cultural norms 
to tell someone straight to his face that he is ‘slow to learn and 
incompetent’5; rather we would prefer to say something like he is ‘kind to 
others’.  So, going back to the question of whether or not selectiveness 
violates the maxim of quantity, the answer is negative. The argument is that 
although it may not give the full information from both positive and 
negative sides, the reality is that in situations where selectiveness prevails, 
there is probably no requirement for language users to give more 
information than they want to. 
There is a distinction between requirements from language itself and 
requirements from the culture where the language is used. The requirement 
could be the context at a specific moment, in which language consideration 
alone may not be enough. In the case of the principle of selectiveness, 
cultural considerations play a huge role. Very often language users behave 
the way their cultural protocols require them to. For example, out of 
politeness, not articulating someone's shortcomings unless it is necessary. 
This is a cultural factor, which often supersedes the language factor itself. 
That is to say, when there is conflict between language correctness and 
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cultural correctness, the latter tends to prevail. It is also expected to be the 
case that some cultures (e.g. Chinese) may embrace more indirectness than 
other cultures, so we see more application of the principle of selectiveness 
in these languages than in others. 
Maxim of relevance: ‘Be relevant’ (Grice, 1975: 46). 
This one is relatively straightforward. Selectiveness doesn't violate this 
maxim. By applying the principle of selectiveness we usually try to avoid 
talking about the negative side of things and focus on the positives. This 
doesn't mean that the positive side of information is irrelevant. It could be 
just as relevant as the negatives. So we are not breaking any rules on 
relevance.  
Maxim of manner: “‘Be perspicuous’... 1 Avoid obscurity of 
expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. 
Be orderly’ (Grice, 1975: 46). 6
Being selective doesn't prevent one from being perspicuous.   
It is interesting to note that maxim of quantity and maxim of relevance 
may not accommodate the way the Chinese tend to communicate.  For 
example, when talking about sensitive issues (e.g. borrowing money), the 
Chinese tend to beat about the bush, saying things seemingly superfluous 
and irrelevant. The purpose of this indirectness is to prevent being totally 
embarrassed by asking bluntly. Although this kind of language behaviour 
may well violate Grice's maxims, it is the typical Chinese way to 
communicate and the right way as far as the Chinese are concerned.  
It seems that language use is just like driving a car; everyone on the 
road must follow road rules. If someone doesn't follow the rules, then car 
accidents may happen. However, the problem here is what rules are truly 
appropriate to govern our language use. The rules for language use are not 
as clear-cut as road rules. Grice's conversational maxims state what should 
be said and how it should be said; however, without cultural considerations, 
they would always remain as idealized conventions. While conversational 
maxims like Grice's certainly help, it would be mistaken to think that his 
maxims would be able to accommodate all the communicative devices 
people use in reality.  
The above analysis on selectiveness based on real estate advertising 
language provides a similar observation as stated in Kotthoff (in press).  
Based on an analysis of conversation humour, Kotthoff points out life-world 
relevance is quite different from the cognitive relevance that Sperber and 
Wilson (1986) focus on. In order to determine how specific jokes work, we 
need knowledge of the social milieu with its social norms and normal ways 
of speaking. Cultural relevance is particularly important in humour. 
Along the same line, selectiveness is sensitive over different situations 
(e.g. formal or informal, intimate or distant) and cultures (e.g. Chinese or 
New Zealand, men or women, academic or corporate). An in-depth analysis 
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and systematic classification of these situations and cultures would require a 
separate research project.   
Next, we will discuss selectiveness and Grice's maxims from a 
different angle: the nature of inferential meaning derived from selective 
utterances, helping us to understand more about the principle of 
selectiveness.  
 
III. Inferential Meaning and Implicatures 
In this study, the concept of inferential meaning is defined in a more 
specific way, different from Grice's conversational implicatures, in a bid to 
show the uniqueness of the selectiveness principle.  
 
3.1 Inferential Meanings  
Prior to discussing the inferential meaning, let us first look at a related 
concept: connotative meaning.   
According to Crystal (1993: 74), a connotative meaning is the 
‘emotional associations (personal or communal) which are suggested by, or 
are part of the meaning of, a LINGUISTIC UNIT, especially a LEXICAL 
ITEM.’ For example, the connotations of the word ‘Paris’ may include 
‘romantic’, ‘luxurious’, ‘high class’, etc. 
The similarity between inferential meaning and connotative meaning is 
that both are not literal meanings, and both need recourse to 
context/knowledge of interlocutors for a specific interpretation. However, 
the two differ in a number of aspects. 
a. Connotations tend to relate more to a lexical item, but inferential 
meaning relates more to linguistic units broader than a lexical item, 
such as phrase, sentence, utterance, etc. 
b. Connotations could be part of lexical item's meaning. For example, 
one of the connotations of ‘dog’ in Chinese is a person of 
unquestioning obedience, typically to a gang leader or the like 
(Xihua Dictionary, 1996: 152). This is unlikely the case for 
inferential meaning. For example, the inferential meaning ‘old’ 
inferred from ‘(house with) character’ would not be any part of the 
original item's meaning. 
c. Connotations are intended meanings that the speaker wants the 
hearer to know. For example, if someone looks unhappy during 
Chinese New Year, and I say to him, ‘Come on, it's Chinese New 
Year’, the connotative meaning of ‘New Year’ is ‘happy and 
joyful’. I as a speaker certainly want the hearer to know the 
connotative meaning, which is ‘you should cheer up during this 
joyful season’. However, inferential meanings are not necessarily 
intended to be recognised by hearers. In fact in the case of real 
estate advertisements, agents rather hope that their readers are not 
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able to work out the inferential meaning behind the advertisements 
(see Section 3.2 for more discussion). 
Take an example from real estate advertisement, a house ‘with great 
potential’. The speaker's intended meaning in this case would be just the 
semantic (literal) meaning; a house has an excellent opportunity to prosper. 
However, thinking through the semantic meaning, a pragmatic (or 
contextual) meaning that a hearer may infer is that the current condition of 
the house is not that great, probably needing renovation of some sort. The 
speaker would hope that the hearer stick to the focus (‘great potential’) 
given in the advertisement and not work out that the house is in an 
undesirable state at the moment. The type of meaning we are dealing with 
here is inferential meaning inferred with resource to context or the hearer's 
knowledge, as opposed to semantic meaning 
(cognitive/denotative/referential meaning).   
Next, we shall discuss the characteristics of Grice's conversational 
implicatures, which can also help us to understand more about the nature of 
the principle of selectiveness characterised with inferential meaning. 
 
3.2 Implicatures  
Implied meaning usually refers to a meaning derived from the given 
text. For example, John came back to his shared flat and turned his stereo 
on. Mary said to John, ‘Someone has to study!’ The implied meaning is 
obvious: she wants John to turn the volume down. Is this kind of implied 
meaning similar to the inferential meaning? 
They have one thing in common:  being inferred from a certain 
context. If it were not for the above specific context, the implied meaning of 
the sentence ‘Someone has to study!’ could be something different. For 
instance, if this is said by a teacher to a student, then the implied meaning 
could be that the teacher is telling the student to study more; otherwise he 
would fail exams and not be able to graduate. The inferential meaning is 
also context sensitive. For example, a real estate advertisement refers to a 
house ‘with great potential’; viewers may infer that the house is of little 
worth in its present state. However, if a colleague says it, they may at least 
take a look, because usually a colleague wouldn't have a hidden agenda.  
However, the difference between implied and inferential meaning is 
that, again, the inferential meaning is not intended to be known by the 
hearer. By contrast, the implied meaning is. For example, for the sake of 
politeness, someone says that a Ph.D. thesis ‘is interesting’ to avoid saying 
‘it is poorly written’ or ‘it has no original ideas’, etc. It would be assumed 
that the speaker does not want the hearer to know what he really thinks of 
the thesis. The inferential meaning here would be entirely the hearer's 
making, he would have to work it out by himself, without much help from 
the speaker. The implied meaning, however, is usually intended for hearers 
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to know. For instance, Mary would very much hope that John got her 
message of ‘turn your volume down’ by saying ‘someone has to study’. 
Otherwise, there is no point for Mary to utter that sentence at all. One other 
example is irony. A stand-up comedian uses irony with the definite 
intention of making his audience know the implied meaning of the irony. If 
he doesn't, then he could expect a gloomy future. 
The difference of whether or not the implied/inferential meaning is 
intended for the hearer to know brings up another difference between the 
inferential meaning and implied meaning: different purposes for 
communication. The former is used often for the purpose of being selective, 
focusing on one particular aspect in order to minimize some other 
undesirable aspect(s). A typical case is real estate commercials. On the 
other hand, the implied meaning serves somewhat different purposes. One 
typical case is irony, in which the speaker overtly flouts Grice's maxims for 
humorous effect.  
One other related concept is fuzzy meaning, which is defined as a 
semantic meaning that has no clear-cut meaning boundaries. For example, 
how tall is ‘tall’ and how beautiful is ‘pretty’. The meaning of the two 
varies from context to context, individual to individual. There are 
differences among the four concepts of fuzziness, vagueness, generality and 
ambiguity, see Zhang (1998) for a detailed discussion of the topic. 
A similarity between fuzzy meaning and inferential meaning is that 
they both contain an undetermined meaning. Fuzzy meaning has, needless 
to say, grey areas and with inferential interpretation there is often a ‘maybe’ 
situation, not an absolute one. For example, when we see an ad with ‘needs 
tender loving care’, what we infer from it can be different, due to different 
contexts and our various backgrounds and knowledge of the world.  
However, fuzzy meaning is part of a lexical item's denotative meaning, 
which is different from inferential meaning because the latter is unlikely a 
part of the original meaning of the utterance given. Also, fuzzy meaning can 
hardly be resolved by context. For example, most likely we would not be 
able to provide a universal standard for application of the word 'intelligent' 
no matter what context we are in. However, inferential meaning could be 
determined by a specific context. For example, in the context of a real estate 
ad, the hearer would be able to infer ‘a shabby house’ from ‘house with 
great potential’. 
 
To sum up, while inferential meaning associated with selectiveness has 
similar features to Grice's conversational implicatures, it differs primarily in 
terms of the speaker's intended meaning. Below is an overall profile of the 
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Inferential  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Implicature No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Connotative  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fuzzy Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 
IV The Inference Process of Selectiveness  
In this section, the focus is on the inference process of selectiveness 
through a comparison with Grice's conversational implicatures. Grice 
discussed during his 1967 lectures at Harvard University what he called 
‘conversational implicatures’, concerning how hearers try to get the 
complete message when speakers mean more than they say. It was first 
proposed in the 1960s and later revised in Grice (1989).  
Grice's maxims can be violated (intentionally or unintentionally) to 
achieve certain conversational implicatures. Grice proposed that the 
implicature could be worked out based on: 
a. The literal linguistic meaning of what is said 
b. Information indicated in the context   
c. A belief that the speaker would follow the cooperative principle 
 
Let us compare the following two examples: 
Example 1 (conversational implicature): a teacher walks in a classroom and 
said: ‘It is stuffy here’. He implies that the window(s) should be opened, 
which would be inferred by students in the room.  
Example 2 (inference in selectiveness): In Chinese, out of politeness people 
tend to say someone's physical condition is ‘really strong’ when in fact this 
someone is overweight. The hearer would normally be able to work out the 
message of being ‘overweight’. Another example would be real estate 
advertisements. The readers may get the sense of 'old or possible shabby' 
from ‘a house with character’.  
What, then, are the differences between Grice's conversational 
implicatures and the inference guided by principle of selectiveness then? 
They are as follows. 
a. As previously mentioned, in Grice's conversational implicatures, 
speakers would like their hearers to know the information that is 
implied. In Example 1 above, the teacher would certainly hope that 
his students in the classroom could get his hint and open the 
windows. Interestingly, in the case of inference for selectiveness 
speakers certainly do not intend hearers to work out any 
information that is not good as far as the speaker is concerned.  
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That is, usually the speaker does not mean to imply any different 
meaning except the literal meaning. As shown in Example 2, 
neither the Chinese speaker of the polite remark nor the real estate 
agent wants their hearers to know anything other than what has 
been said. In any event, the speaker, who knows hearers may work 
out something more, would not be willing to disclose that 
something more to hearers.  
b. In Example 1, the speaker means more than they say. By contrast, 
in Example 2 the speakers do not mean more than what they say. 
They mean exactly what they say, and they want their hearers to 
infer nothing more from it. In selectiveness, usually there is no 
implicature from the speaker's end. If hearers get anything other 
than the semantic meaning the speaker gives, it would not be the 
speaker's intention.  
c. In Grice's conversational implicatures, the speaker is supposed to 
make an effort to let their hearers know what is implied by what 
has been said. That is, the speaker is supposed to somehow manage 
to make their flouting of maxims known to the hearer. But in the 
case of selectiveness, speakers may have no such intention; they 
would prefer that the hearers understand exactly what they tell 
them. The reason is simple: these speakers don't intend to have any 
implicatures from their utterances. If there are any, it would be 
entirely the hearer's job to work them out by themselves. That is, 
working out the inferential meaning depends solely on hearers' 
ability to recognize the selectiveness.    
d. Based on the above three, it is expected that the hearers in the case 
of selectiveness have a tougher job working out the inferential 
meaning. Although it is a tougher job, hearers are usually able to 
work it out eventually. For example, in Example 2 above, hearers 
are expected to be able to infer ‘old, scruffy’ from a real estate 
advertisement of ‘a house with character’ or ‘a house with great 
potential’.  Similarly, hearers, given the specific context, should 
also have no problem knowing that the person referred to is 
overweight, through the semantic meaning of  ‘really strong’.   
 
Furthermore, let us examine the inference process of conversational 
implicature and selectiveness: 
 
Conversational implicature: 
a. The speaker means more than he says; he says A but actually 
means B. 
b. Both speaker and hearer are aware that the speaker has, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, violated a maxim. 
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c. The speaker assumes that the hearer will, one way or another (via 
context, knowledge and common sense, etc.), manage to figure out 
B from A. 
It should be noted that one of the reasons for using conversational 
implicature is that the speaker counts on the hearer being able to work out 
what is implied.  
 
Selectiveness: 
a. Speaker is being selective in giving certain information and using 
certain words to suit certain purposes (e.g. advertising or 
politeness). They say A and mean A. 
b. Both speaker and hearer are aware that the speaker, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, is being less informative on certain 
aspects (but not necessarily violating the maxims).  Usually the 
hearer is aware that the speaker may withhold certain information. 
c. The speaker hopes that the hearer cannot work out the information 
they are trying to withhold. 
As shown, the inference process for selectiveness and the 
conversational implicatures is not quite the same. In the former case, the 
interesting thing is that the speaker probably knows at the start that the 
hearer would eventually work out the unspoken part of the information 
(although it is not their intention), but since being selective is common 
practice and people from both ends master it well, we keep doing it. In the 
case of being polite, both parties know that the speaker is just being polite 
by not saying anything bluntly. It is not a matter of using a correct language 
form to state the fact; but a matter of pragmatic requirement (not being 
rude).  Meanwhile, the hearer's inference has not come through systematic 
logical reasoning; it is an informal inference/reasoning in an everyday 
situation.   
Finally, in terms of how the inferential process is made by the hearer in 
the case of the selectiveness principle, two elements are crucial: common 
sense and background knowledge shared with the speaker; and pragmatic 
meaning of the linguistic items used in a specific situation. For example, 
seeing the wording ‘a cosy and easy care house’ in a teal estate ad, readers 
should normally be able to infer that this house is probably ‘small’ by using 




The principle of selectiveness is discussed together with Grice's 
conversational maxims. Based on what has been discussed, it is concluded  
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that the applicability of Grice's maxims is a matter of degree. The maxims 
cannot be taken as absolute rules; this would be neither right nor 
practicable. Language is not as clear-cut as mathematical formulas; it 
integrates with culture, society, etc. As shown in this study, 
cultural/pragmatic considerations tend to be a deciding factor for what 
communicative principles to use in order to achieve a successful outcome.  
Very often when language form and cultural norm clash, culture norm 
supersedes language form, as in advertising and situations where politeness 
is required. When communicating, people must follow certain cultural and 
social conventions, suited to particular contexts.  
The reason that communicators will make recourse to selectiveness is 
because it is appropriate to do so for various purposes (personal interests, 
business profits, cultural and social normality, politeness, etc). In the case of 
real estate advertising, agents can benefit from not making the shortcomings 
of houses so obvious. Similarly, in everyday conversations selectiveness is 
very important in situations like socializing. If one doesn't master the 
principle of selectiveness, one may not be able to fit into society 
successfully.  
It should be noted that language users would normally be as 
informative as required except where this goes against their abilities, their 
own interests or preferences. Whether or not we employ selectiveness is a 
matter of need. It is in the communicator's own interests to make their 
utterance as informative or otherwise as selective as possible; it all depends 
on circumstances.  
While the principle of selectiveness doesn't seem to violate any of 
Grice's maxims, it is not adequately represented by any of them either.  As 
shown, inferential meaning associated with selectiveness is different from 
Grice's conversational implicatures in that speakers do not want the hearers 
to work out anything other than the literal meaning of the utterances. Based 
on the fact that selectiveness in language use is a way of life and should 
therefore be represented, it is proposed to add into Grice's maxims a maxim 
of appropriateness governing pragmatic/cultural considerations. Practices 
like the principle of selectiveness could be placed under this banner, which 
could then compensate for a weak point of Grice's maxims, i.e. the lack of 
cultural considerations.  
The implication of this study is that we should never underestimate the 
impact that cultural and other pragmatic factors have on our language use. 
Any adequate study of language use should take into account the integration 
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Notes 
                                                 
       1 I wish to thank Joe Murphy and Gretchen Lee of Fu Jen Studies and 
the anonymous reviewers for their valuable help.   
In this paper, for reasons of simplicity the term ‘speaker’ includes 
‘speaker and author’; similarly, ‘hearer’ includes ‘hearer and reader’. 
Pragmatic meaning is defined here as meaning conveyed in a certain 
context. Context includes linguistic (the text where an utterance occurs) and 
non-linguistic (shared and general knowledge).   
        2 The cultural setting from which the real estate advertisement data is 
taken is the New Zealand English speaking community; the examples come 
primarily from Property Press published in Auckland, New Zealand. 
        3 Please note that the advertising language discussed in this study has 
no deceiving element in it. False advertising is not of interest in this project. 
What is of interest here are advertisements that are selective yet not 
deceptive.    
        4 Property ads normally come with a picture, which may help buyers to 
see what a house looks like. However, usually the picture has been taken on 
a selective basis too; probably it shows only what the agent wants us to see.  
        5 Of course in some cases we may be required to say these words, for 
example when being asked by a potential employer or his parents. 
        6 One may be demanded to be more mannered in some situations like 
teaching or a job interview, while in other situations, for example with 
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